IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device
构建理论模型，说明债务回购和IMF项目都能作为筛选工具，帮助债权人区分愿意用债务减免来投资还款的国家和不愿的国家，对研究债务危机和国际金融的学者有用。
A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When the country is credit constrained, an alternative screening mechanism is to undertake an IMF programme in return for debt reduction and possibly an IMF loan