Bundling and Licensing of Genes in Agricultural Biotechnology
研究基因持有者与种子公司、化学投入品公司纵向整合的战略动机，发现纯捆绑策略占优，而混合捆绑可阻止潜在进入者，纵向合并通过第三方许可解决可信性问题。
Abstract We examine the strategic incentive for gene holders to vertically integrate with seed companies and chemical input companies. With homogeneous conventional seeds, we find that a pure bundling strategy (produce the genetically modified seed only) is dominant. When the gene holder and breeder are, respectively, the monopolistic producers of genetically modified and conventional seeds, they may commit to mixed bundling (supply both genetically modified and conventional seed) to deter potential entry to the conventional seed market. A vertical merger may solve the credibility issue of the mixed bundling commitment through third party licensing agreements in the conventional seed market.