Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information and equilibrium prices
分析信息不对称下企业边际成本变化对价格的非对称影响：不知情企业成本上升推高价格，而知情企业成本上升反而通过改善不知情企业的客户分布使均衡价格下降。适用于信贷、保险、劳动力市场等场景。
We present an analysis of competition under asymmetric information where prices react asymmetrically to changes in firms' marginal costs. When one firm has private information about some customers, an increase in an uninformed firm's marginal cost leads to a price increase, as usual. However, an increase in the informed firm's marginal cost causes the equilibrium price to fall by improving the distribution of customers served by the uninformed firm. The model applies to settings where information asymmetries are important determinants of competition, such as credit, insurance, labor markets, or for the sale of goods where repeat business is important.