Macroprudential Regulation Versus Mopping Up After the Crash
研究了当政策制定者同时拥有流动性工具应对危机时，宏观审慎政策应如何设计，发现事后流动性提供会降低宏观审慎的必要性，但需考虑其事前激励效应和影子银行的影响。
Abstract How should macroprudential policy be designed when policymakers also have access to liquidity provision tools to manage crises? We show in a tractable model of systemic banking risk that there are three factors at play: first, ex post liquidity provision mitigates financial crises, and this reduces the need for macroprudential policy. In the extreme, if liquidity provision is untargeted and costless or if it completely forestalls crises by credible out-of-equilibrium lending-of-last-resort, there is no role left for macroprudential regulation. Second, however, macroprudential policy needs to consider the ex ante incentive effects of targeted liquidity provision. Third, if shadow banking reduces the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments, it is optimal to commit to less generous liquidity provision as a second-best substitute for macroprudential policy.