Voluntary Appointment of Independent Directors in Taiwan: Motives and Consequences
研究台湾上市公司在无法律强制要求下自愿增加董事会独立性的动机，发现其受经济因素和管理层权力影响，且自愿任命独立董事能提升公司绩效。
Abstract: This study explores factors that motivate firms to increase board independence in the absence of legal requirements to do so. In addition, we examine the impact of voluntary enhancement of board independence on firm performance. Using a sample of listed companies in Taiwan, we show that voluntary appointment of independent directors is associated with both economic factors and managerial power. Specifically, we find that board independence increases with the weaknesses of alternative corporate governance mechanisms and the severity of agency problems. However, board independence decreases with managerial ownership and family control. In addition, by employing a simultaneous equations model with selectivity, we provide evidence supporting the positive performance impact of voluntary appointment of independent directors in Taiwan.