Dynamic Speculative Attacks
构建了一个理性贝叶斯代理人模型，分析在汇率目标区制度下投机者如何通过观察汇率波动来协调攻击，并探讨央行未公开的干预政策能否通过减少市场信息来维持汇率稳定。
This paper presents a model of rational Bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band. Speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack. Multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks. Various defense policies are analyzed. A trading policy by the central bank may defend the peg if it is unobserved and diminishes the market's information for the coordination of speculators.