Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders
研究公司内部人如何使用零成本领口和股权互换来对冲个人持股风险，发现这些交易主要由高层内部人进行，平均减少约25%的持股，并建议提高交易透明度以帮助投资者。
Zero-cost collars and equity swaps provide insiders with the opportunity to hedge the risk associated with their personal holdings in the company's equity. Consequently, their use has important implications for incentive-based contracting and for understanding insider trading behavior. Our analysis indicates that these transactions generally involve high-ranking insiders and effectively reduce their ownership by about 25%, on average. Given the potential of these financial instruments to substantially alter the incentive alignment between managers and shareholders, we suggest that increasing the transparency of these transactions may provide valuable information to investors.