车间决策权的分配:来自交易成本经济学与组织理论的视角

Allocating Decision Rights on the Shop Floor: A Perspective from Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory

ORGANIZATION SCIENCE · 2004
被引 56
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

基于交易成本经济学和组织理论,利用西班牙食品和电子行业调查数据,研究了车间决策权分配与劳动交易属性及企业结构特征的关系,发现雇主机会主义比员工机会主义更具解释力。

Abstract

This paper explores the links that the allocation of decision rights on the shop floor maintains with labor transaction attributes and several structural traits of the firm. The approach is based on the transaction cost apparatus and harnesses the theoretical and empirical background provided by organization theory. Data are presented from a wide field survey in the Spanish food and electronics industries (Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 20 and 36). Evidence not only verifies the influence of firm size, property, age, and unionism, but also shows that the allocation of decision rights is related to a particular mix of labor transaction traits. Specifically, one of the most important results is that employer opportunism offers greater explanatory power than employee opportunism.

交易成本经济学组织理论劳动交易决策权分配产业组织