Public and private health‐care financing with alternate public rationing rules
研究了在按需配给和随机配给两种公共配给规则下，公共与私人医疗融资的并行运作，发现私人保险的引入会将治疗从相对贫困者转向相对富裕者，且按需配给时私人保险市场规模更小。
We develop a model to analyze parallel public and private health-care financing under two alternative public sector rationing rules: needs-based rationing and random rationing. Individuals vary in income and severity of illness. There is a limited supply of health-care resources used to treat individuals, causing some individuals to go untreated. Insurers (both public and private) must bid to obtain the necessary health-care resources to treat their beneficiaries. Given individuals' willingnesses-to-pay for private insurance are increasing in income, the introduction of private insurance diverts treatment from relatively poor to relatively rich individuals. Further, the impact of introducing parallel private insurance depends on the rationing mechanism in the public sector. We show that the private health insurance market is smaller when the public sector rations according to need than when allocation is random.