An Organizational Justice‐Based View of Self‐Control and Agency Costs in Family Firms
整合经济学与组织公正理论，提出家庭企业中控制所有者自我控制对家族与非家族员工公正感知的差异化影响，从而解释代理成本的精细成因。
abstract By integrating insights from two seemingly disparate literatures – economics and organizational justice – within the general agency framework, we advance propositions that suggest a fine‐grained explanation of agency costs at family firms. In so doing, we account for the differential effects of the controlling owners' self‐control (i.e. the governance mechanisms they adopt and how they administer those mechanisms) on the justice perceptions of the family and non‐family employees. Our integrative view allows us to strike a realistic balance between the overly optimistic views about family firm governance that have been expressed by agency scholars and the overly pessimistic views expressed by management scholars in the past few years.