GETTING IT DONE: DYNAMIC INCENTIVES TO COMPLETE A PROJECT
研究委托人如何设计动态合同激励代理人完成项目，代理人努力不可观测，分析了完全承诺、序贯理性及再谈判下的最优合同形式。
A principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that the project is completed. We characterize the contracts that the principal sets, with and without commitment. With full commitment, the contract involves the agent's value and wage declining over time, in order to give the agent incentives to exert effort. The best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal also involves the agent's wage declining over time, while the worst sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal has a constant wage (and is in fact the unique stationary equilibrium). The best (weakly) renegotiation-proof equilibrium for the principal is achieved by a constant wage that maximizes the principal's payoff, conditional on wages being constant. We compare these solutions to the efficient outcome.