Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency
研究股票市场作为凯恩斯选美竞赛时，会计信息披露对市场效率的影响，发现公开信息总能推动股价更接近基本面价值，因此透明度不应因选美竞赛效应而降低。
ABSTRACT This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes [1936] and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin [2006]. In such markets, public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian‐beauty‐contest effect.