Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor
构建模型分析为何性别劳动分工常由习俗强制推行，并涉及方向与禁止；研究发现，专业化选择和人力资本积累中的策略性激励可能导致浪费行为，而习俗性性别分工可缓解此问题，但并非帕累托改进，且其分配效应和福利收益随市场交换机会增加而下降。
We consider why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition. In our formal model, agents first learn skills and then enter the marriage market. We show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in specialization choice and human capital acquisition and that both problems may be mitigated through a customary gender division of labor. This division is not Pareto improving. Both the distributional effects and welfare gains of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities for market exchange increase.