Reverse Price Discrimination with Bayesian Buyers
研究了当买家初始估值可被卖家观察但后续获得私人信息时，卖家可能对低估值买家定高价而对高估值买家定低价的反向价格歧视现象，并在垄断和双寡头市场中推导出该结果。
This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via B ayes' rule. We show that, in this environment, prices are not monotone in buyers' prior valuations. Interestingly, this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer ( Reverse Price Discrimination ). We derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets.