Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets
研究在技能随机演化且为私人信息、存在不可观测保险交易的经济中，最优税收如何设计。发现竞争均衡无效率，政府可通过扭曲资本积累改善福利，且公共保险会挤出私人保险。
We study optimal taxation in an economy where the skills of agents evolve stochastically over time and are private information and in which agents can trade unobservably in competitive markets. We show that competitive equilibria are constrained inefficient. The government can improve welfare by distorting capital accumulation with the sign ofthe distortion depending on the nature of the skill process. Finally, we show that private insurance provision responds endogenously to policy, that government insurance tends to crowd out private insurance, and, in a calibrated example, that this crowding out effect is large.