Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common‐Pool Resource
利用不列颠哥伦比亚省比目鱼渔场的企业数据，研究私有化对技术效率、配置效率和经济效率的影响，发现短期效率提升需数年且受产权限制，长期效率可能被既有法规和产权捆绑损害。
The British Columbia halibut fishery provides a natural experiment of the effects of ''privatizing the commons.'' Using firm-level data from the fishery 2 years before private harvesting rights were introduced, the year they were implemented, and 3 years afterward, a stochastic frontier is estimated to test for changes in technical, allocative, and economic efficiency. The study indicates that (1) the short-run efficiency gains from privatization may take several years to materialize and can be compromised by restrictions on transferability, duration, and divisibility of the property right; (2) substantial long-run gains in efficiency can be jeopardized by preexisting regulations and the bundling of the property right to the capital stock; and (3) the gains from privatization are not just in terms of cost efficiency but include important benefits in revenue and product form.