CRIME IN A MULTI‐JURISDICTIONAL MODEL WITH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PREVENTION*
研究了在多辖区模型中，增加公共预防（如警力）可能因私人预防行为变化而吸引或转移犯罪，这一反直觉结果对政策制定者和犯罪研究者有重要启示。
ABSTRACT Criminals move between jurisdictions in response to differences in the net returns to crime that depend on the opportunity for crime and the effort to prevent crime. An increase in police protection of a jurisdiction diverts crime to other jurisdictions when only public crime prevention such as police protection is available. However, residents also invest in private prevention (private security, burglar alarms, etc.), and the value of these measures depends on the level of local public protection. In a spatial context, an increase in public prevention of a jurisdiction not only alters the incentives of individuals of the jurisdiction, but also of other jurisdictions as well, and such a change in private crime prevention may end up attracting crime to the jurisdiction. An increase in public prevention of a jurisdiction thus may divert or attract crime. This ambiguous effect stands in contrast with the literature and may appear counterintuitive, but is logical under plausible conditions.