A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free‐Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering
针对地球工程中单边行动导致的“自由驾驶者”外部性问题，提出一种基于绝对多数投票规则的社会选择决策架构，并推导其基本性质。
Abstract Abating climate change is an enormous international public‐goods problem with a classical “free‐rider” structure. However, it is also a global “free‐driver” problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril. This exploratory paper develops the main features of a free‐driver externality in a simple model motivated by the asymmetric consequences of type‐I and type‐II errors. I propose a social‐choice decision architecture, embodying the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule, and derive its basic properties.