Strategic determinants of decisions not to settle patent litigation
研究了企业为何选择不和解专利诉讼，发现专利作为保护战略利益和防御性工具的作用，并通过样本选择Probit模型验证了战略利益假说。
Abstract Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are derived for two types of influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their ‘defensive’ role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold‐up. Parameter estimates from a sample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the evidence for mutual hold‐up is inconclusive. Interindustry comparisons show that nonsettlement of patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased by strategic stakes and, in addition, mutual hold‐up appears to play an important role in computer patent suits. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.