Does Mandatory Rotation of Audit Partners Improve Audit Quality?
利用中国审计调整的独特数据，检验了审计合伙人强制轮换对审计质量的影响，发现轮换前后审计调整频率显著提高，表明强制轮换提升了审计质量。
ABSTRACT Opponents of mandatory rotation argue that a change of partner is bad for audit quality, as it results in a loss of client-specific knowledge. On the other hand, proponents argue that a change of partner is beneficial, as it results in a positive peer review effect and a fresh perspective on the audit. We test the impact of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality using a unique dataset of audit adjustments in China. Our results suggest that mandatory rotation of engagement partners results in higher quality audits in the years immediately surrounding rotation. Specifically, we find a significantly higher frequency of audit adjustments during the departing partner's final year of tenure prior to mandatory rotation and during the incoming partner's first year of tenure following mandatory rotation.