The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Delegation
在两阶段差异化产品寡头模型中，企业所有者先选择激励方案影响经理行为，随后经理进行价格或数量竞争。若所有者能充分操纵经理激励，无论第二阶段竞争方式如何，均衡结果相同。
In a two-stage differentiated-products oligopoly model, profit-maximizing owners first choose incentive schemes in order to influence their managers' behavior. In the second stage, the managers compete either both in prices, both in quantities, or one in price and the other in quantity. If the owners have sufficient power to manipulated their managers' incentives, the equilibrium outcome is the same regardless of how the firms compete in the second stage. If demand is linear and marginal cost is constant, basing the manager's objective function on a linear combination of the firm's profit and its rival's profit is sufficient for the equivalence result. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.