Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?*
研究存在外部性且包含社会偏好者与自私者的环境中，最优矫正税率是否应因偏好类型而异，发现税率与社会偏好程度无关，因此不应区别征税。
Abstract In this paper, we consider an environment where individual actions have externalities and two types of agents exist: agents with social preferences (the good) and selfish agents. Selfish agents have pay‐off functions that do not take into account social welfare. The pay‐off of an agent is a linear combination of social welfare and the pay‐off of a selfish agent. We demonstrate that the corrective tax rates that maximize social welfare do not depend on the degree of social preferences. Hence, the good and the selfish should not be taxed differently.