The Relationship Between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies: A Study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games
分析英国公司样本中持股与投票权分布的关系，应用Shapley-Shubik和Banzhaf权力指数，发现权力比所有权更集中，且Banzhaf指数给出的权力分布更集中。
This paper reports an analysis of the relationships between shareholding and voting power distributions in a sample of British companies. It applies two standard approaches to the measurement of power in simple games: the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices. The results indicate that power is more concentrated than ownership in every case. A comparison of the two indices reveals that typically the Banzhaf index gives a more concentrated power distribution. For the Shapley-Shubik index the power ratio for the largest shareholder is accurately described in terms of the size of holding and the concentration of the remainder. The corresponding Banzhaf power ratio is less dependent on these variables. There is no association between power concentration and company size.