Do Earnings Targets and Managerial Incentives Affect Sticky Costs?
研究管理者为达成盈利目标而调整资源的行为，发现避免亏损或盈利下降的动机会加速削减闲置资源，从而降低成本粘性，而非加剧粘性。
ABSTRACT This study explores motivations underlying managers’ resource adjustments. We focus on the impact of incentives to meet earnings targets on resource adjustments and the ensuing cost structures. We find that, when managers face incentives to avoid losses or earnings decreases, or to meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, they expedite downward adjustment of slack resources for sales decreases. These deliberate decisions lessen the degree of cost stickiness rather than induce cost stickiness. The results suggest that efforts to understand determinants of firms’ cost structures should be made in light of the managers’ motivations, particularly agency‐driven incentives underlying resource adjustment decisions.