An Analysis of Bidding in the Japanese Government Bond Auctions
分析日本国债拍卖中的投标模式和拍卖利润，实证检验拍卖理论预测，发现平均利润接近零，竞争和不确定性对利润影响不显著，且美日交易商中标份额与利润关系相反。
We examine the bidding patterns and auction profits in the Japanese Government Bond (JGB) auctions and empirically test the predictions of auction theory. We find that the average profit in JGB auctions is not reliably different from zero, and the degree of competition and the level of uncertainty are insignificant in determining auction profits. The winning shares of the U.S. dealers are positively related to auction profits, whereas the winning shares of their Japanese counterparts show a negative association. We also find that the share of winnings of Japanese dealers tends to be correlated with the share of winnings of their compatriot dealers but a similar relation is not found for U.S. dealers.