Moral Hazard, Income Taxation and Prospect Theory*
研究当个体行为遵循前景理论时，不确定性下的最优收入税理论如何改变，发现标准结果在损失域不成立，边际税率在参考消费水平附近提供完全保险。
Abstract The standard theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty has been developed under the assumption that individuals maximise expected utility. However, prospect theory has now been established as an alternative model of individual behaviour, with empirical support. This paper explores the theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty when individuals behave according to the tenets of prospect theory. It is seen that many of the standard results are modified in interesting ways. The first‐order approach for solving the optimisation problem is not valid over the domain of losses, and the marginal tax schedule offers full insurance around the reference consumption level. The implications of non‐welfarist objectives under income uncertainty are also examined.