Risk Rationing and Wealth Effects in Credit Markets: Theory and Implications for Agricultural Development
提出信息不对称导致两种信贷配给：常规数量配给和风险配给，后者使农户只能借高抵押贷款但预期福利低于安全生存活动。研究发现土地确权政策效果有限，需同时应对风险问题。
Abstract We develop a model that shows that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and “risk rationing,” whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high‐collateral contracts that offer them lower expected well‐being than a safe, subsistence activity. After exploring its incidence with respect to wealth, we show that risk rationing has important policy implications. Specifically, land titling will be only partially effective because it does not enhance producers' willingness to offer up the collateral needed to secure loans under moral hazard constraints. Efforts to enhance agricultural investment and the working of agricultural credit markets must step beyond land titling and also deal with risk.