First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now prices with Allais paradox bidders
研究了当竞拍者具有阿莱悖论偏好时，一级价格拍卖和荷兰式拍卖的均衡，发现荷兰式拍卖收益更高，且引入“立即购买”价格能提高卖方预期收益。
This paper investigates first-price and Dutch auctions when bidders have preferences exhibiting the Allais paradox. We characterize an equilibrium for both auctions, paying particular attention to the dynamic inconsistency problems which can arise with such preferences. We show that the Dutch auction systematically yields a higher revenue than the first-price auction. This stands in sharp contrast with the presumption that these auctions are strategically equivalent, which is indeed valid in the expected utility case. We also show that introducing a "buy-it-now-price" to the first-price auction increases seller's expected revenue when bidders have Allais paradox preference while it does not for expected-utility maximizers.