Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination
研究在存在正外部性的金融市场和宏观经济环境中，公共信息传播的最优程度。文章指出，公共信息应以最大精度提供，但有时不应向所有代理人公开；限制公开程度比限制精度更能防止福利损失。
Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare: public announcements serve as focal points for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that reducing public signals' precision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare. This article shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision but, under certain conditions, not to all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s).