Excess Capacity and Asymmetric Information in Developing Country Fisheries: The Malaysian Purse Seine Fishery
探讨发展中国家渔业中因信息不对称导致的委托代理问题，并以马来西亚围网渔业为例，展示在信息有限时估算产能的方法。
Excess capacity poses a problem in many developing country fisheries. These countries often pursue a development strategy aimed at expanding capacity under open access. Sustainable development, however, requires management. Principal‐agent issues from asymmetric information between the regulator and fishers, which potentially form serious obstacles to fisheries management, arise in the likely forms of management. This article discusses principal‐agent issues and examines the principal‐agent moral hazard issue, which is due to divorce of ownership and vessel operations. The article also illustrates a method for estimating capacity when information is limited. The Peninsular Malaysian purse seine fishery forms a case study.