Call Center Outsourcing Contracts Under Information Asymmetry
研究客户公司如何设计不同特征的合同（如按时间付费、按呼叫付费、服务水平协议等），在信息不对称下协调呼叫中心外包商的能力决策，实现系统最优并分配利润。
In this paper, we examine contracts to coordinate the capacity decision of a vendor who has been hired by a client to provide call center support. We consider a variety of contracts, all based on our observations of contracts used by one large vendor. We examine the role of different contract features such as pay-per-time, pay-per-call, service-level agreements, and constraints on service rates and abandonment. We show how different combinations of these contract features enable client firms to better manage vendors when there is information asymmetry about worker productivity. In particular, we focus on how different contracts can coordinate by yielding the system-optimal capacity decision by the vendor and consider how profits are allocated between the client and the vendor.