Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study
通过实验证明，社会偏好（如关系偏好和地位偏好）会系统性地影响供应链交易中的经济决策，关系偏好促进合作与效率，地位偏好则降低效率。
Supply chain contracting literature has traditionally focused on aligning incentives for economically rational players. Recent work has hypothesized that social preferences, as distinct from economic incentives, may influence behavior in supply chain transactions. Social preferences refer to intrinsic concerns for the other party's welfare, reciprocating a history of a positive relationship, and intrinsic desires for a higher relative payoff compared with the other party's when status is salient. This article provides experimental evidence that social preferences systematically affect economic decision making in supply chain transactions. Specifically, supply chain parties deviate from the predictions provided by self-interested profit-maximization models, such that relationship preference promotes cooperation, individual performance, and high system efficiency, sustainable over time; whereas status preference induces tough actions and reduces both system efficiency and individual performance.