Agency Problems in Public Firms: Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts
研究发现，私募股权拥有的公司飞机机队比类似上市公司平均小40%，杠杆收购后公司也会减少机队，表明部分上市公司高管存在过度津贴和薪酬问题。
ABSTRACT This paper uses novel data to examine the fleets of corporate jets operated by both publicly traded and privately held firms. In the cross‐section, firms owned by private equity funds average 40% smaller fleets than observably similar public firms. Similar fleet reductions are observed within firms that undergo leveraged buyouts. Quantile regressions indicate that these results are driven by firms in the upper 30% of the conditional jet distribution. The results thus suggest that executives in a substantial minority of public firms enjoy excessive perquisite and compensation packages.