A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
构建理论模型，分析当投资银行比发行公司更了解资本市场且发行公司无法监督银行分销努力时，如何通过最优合同将定价权委托给银行以应对逆向选择和道德风险，解释新股折价发行现象。
ABSTRACT This paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer, and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker. The optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better‐informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized. The model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues.