Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures
用博弈论分析两种采购拍卖程序（密封投标与顺序降价）对采购成本的影响，发现当竞标者风险厌恶时，密封投标的预期采购成本更低。
This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of the competition for procurement contracts under different auction procedures. One procedure is a "discriminatory" auction in which contractors simultaneously submit sealed bids, and the lowest bidder wins. The other procedure is a "competitive" auction in which the bid price is lowered sequentially until only one interested bidder remains. The focus is on the effect of changes in procurement procedures and the number of bidders on expected procurement costs. If bidders in this model are risk averse, then the expected procurement cost is lower in a discrimatory auction than in a competitive auction.