Was the Federal Reserve Constrained by the Gold Standard During the Great Depression? Evidence from the 1932 Open Market Purchase Program
以1932年10亿美元扩张性公开市场操作为案例，利用远期汇率和利差衡量贬值预期，发现大规模货币扩张并未引发投资者对美国放弃金本位的担忧，金融媒体和美联储记录也缺乏贬值预期或投机攻击的证据。
Could the Federal Reserve have reversed the decline in the money supply during the Great Depression without causing a loss of confidence in the U.S. commitment to the gold standard? This article uses the $1 billion expansionary open market operation in 1932 as a crucial case study. Using forward exchange rates and interest rate differentials to measure devaluation expectations, we find virtually no evidence that the large monetary expansion led investors to believe that the United States would devalue. The financial press and Federal Reserve records also show scant evidence of expectations of devaluation or fear of speculative attack.