Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints
在一个内生抵押约束的资产定价一般均衡模型中，研究了央行购买风险资产这一非常规政策与常规利率政策的效应，发现资产购买的效果取决于其对抵押约束的影响，有时能放松约束、提升福利，但规模过大时反而会收紧约束、降低福利。
We consider the effects of central bank purchases of a risky asset as an additional dimension of policy alongside “conventional” interest rate policy in a general-equilibrium model of asset pricing with endogenous collateral constraints. The effects of asset purchases depend on the way that they affect collateral constraints. We show that under some circumstances, central bank purchases relax financial constraints, increase aggregate demand, and may even achieve a Pareto improvement; but in other cases, they tighten financial constraints, reduce aggregate demand, and lower welfare. The latter case is almost certainly the one that arises if central bank purchases are sufficiently large.