Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
提出一个包含刻板印象的完全声誉均衡模型，预测在有限重复匿名市场中早期会出现合作，并通过新实验验证了该预测，包括最终期回归阶段博弈均衡及不利参数下的非合作行为。
Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters.