The Insiders’ Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation
通过实验室实验检验内部人困境假说，发现即使合并有利可图，企业也可能因单方面作为局外人更有利而放弃合并，且公平考虑也会阻碍合并。
Abstract This paper tests the insiders’ dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders’ dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Stigler, 1950; Kamien and Zang, 1990, 1993). The experimental data provides support for the insiders’ dilemma, and thereby for endogenous rather than exogenous merger theory. More surprisingly, our data suggests that fairness (or relative performance) considerations also make profitable mergers difficult. Mergers that should occur in equilibrium do not, since they require an unequal split of surplus.