Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers
建立模型说明，在收购消息公布后，竞标者股价下跌、目标公司股价上涨，且两者总市值常下降，但这并不意味着收购无效，因为均衡收购数量是约束有效的。
On news of a takeover, the sum of the stock market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet upon news of a takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls.