The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and Capital‐Market Behavior: Early Evidence*
研究2002年萨班斯-奥克斯利法案通过前后资本市场的反应，发现法案通过可能性增加时股价上涨，表明市场认为法案带来的收益超过合规成本。
Abstract The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”) was enacted in response to numerous corporate and accounting scandals. It aims to reinforce corporate accountability and professional responsibility in order to restore investor confidence in corporate America. This study examines the capital‐market reaction to the Act and finds a positive (negative) abnormal return at the time of several legislative events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of the passage of the Act. We interpret this finding as evidence supporting the notion that the Act is wealth‐increasing in the sense that its induced benefits significantly outweigh its imposed compliance costs. We also find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that are more compliant with the provisions of the Act prior to its enactment.