Effective interim collaboration: how firms minimize transaction costs and maximise transaction value
研究美国与日本汽车交易关系，发现高资产专用性不一定导致高交易成本，通过不同控制机会主义的保障措施可同时实现低交易成本和高资产专用性，并详细分析了日本企业有效合作的实践。
This study of automotive transaction relationships in the U.S.A. and Japan offers data which indicate that transaction costs do not necessarily increase with an increase in relation-specific investments. We empirically examine the conditions under which transactors can simultaneously achieve the twin benefits of high asset specificity and low transaction costs. This is possible because the different safeguards which can be employed to control opportunism have different set-up costs and result in different transaction costs over different time horizons. We examine in detail the practices of Japanese firms which result in effective interfirm collaboration. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.