Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance*
基于银行与借款人关系的理论模型，研究发现小企业因信息不对称问题，其贷款利率加成率随企业年龄呈现先低后高再降的生命周期模式，且该模式主要由信息问题而非银行市场集中度驱动。
Abstract We derive empirical implications from a theoretical model of bank–borrower relationships. The interest‐rate mark‐ups of banks are predicted to follow a life‐cycle pattern over the age of the borrowing firms. Because of endogenous bank monitoring by competing banks, borrowing firms initially face a low mark‐up, and thereafter an increasing mark‐up as a result of informational lock‐in, until it falls for older firms when the lock‐in is resolved. By applying a large sample of predominantly small unlisted firms and a new measure of asymmetric information, we find that firms with significant asymmetric‐information problems have a more pronounced life‐cycle pattern of interest‐rate mark‐ups. Additionally, we examine the effects of concentrated banking markets on interest‐rate mark‐ups. The results indicate that the life cycle of mark‐ups is mainly driven by asymmetric‐information problems and not by concentration. However, we find evidence that bank market concentration matters for older firms †