Speculative runs on interest rate pegs
分析了央行设定利率目标时可能出现的一种新型均衡，即私人部门大量借贷导致货币快速增长、影子利率偏离政策目标，形成对利率目标的投机性挤兑，尤其在银行持有大量超额准备金时风险更高。研究指出，成功管理退出策略需要额外工具，如冻结超额准备金或财政干预。
We analyze a new class of equilibria that emerges when a central bank conducts monetary policy by setting an interest rate (as an arbitrary function of its available information) and letting the private sector set the quantity traded. These equilibria involve a run on the central bank׳s interest target, whereby money grows fast, private agents borrow as much as possible against the central bank, and the shadow interest rate is different from the policy target. We argue that these equilibria represent a particular danger when banks hold large excess reserves, such as is the case following periods of quantitative easing. Our analysis suggests that successfully managing the exit strategy requires additional tools beyond setting interest-rate targets and paying interest on reserves; in particular, freezing excess reserves or fiscal-policy intervention may be needed to fend off adverse expectations.