Auditing in the Presence of Outside Sources of Information
研究审计师终止多期客户关系的能力如何为其提供一项实物期权，该期权的价值取决于现任审计师与其他潜在审计师之间的信息不对称性质，并分析了私人信息与公共信息是互补还是替代关系。
We examine how an auditor’s ability to terminate a multi‐period client relationship provides the auditor with a real option whose value depends on the nature of informational asymmetry between the incumbent and other potential auditors. In particular, we isolate conditions under which the auditor’s private and public sources of information behave as complements rather than substitutes. In such circumstances, increasing the likelihood of publicly provided information induces the auditor to expend more (rather than less)resources in private information gathering activities.