Global Warming with Green and Brown Consumers
研究了绿色消费者（因过度消费感到内疚）如何缓解全球变暖中的公地悲剧，通过微分博弈分析绿色与棕色消费者的互动，发现绿色偏好、消费者异质性和排放不可逆性导致非连续策略及一些反直觉现象。
Abstract In this paper, I investigate how much green polluters mitigate the familiar dynamic “tragedy of the commons” (“global warming”). Green consumers feel penalized (“pain”) for any consumption in excess of the social optimum; this can arise, for example, from Kant’s categorical moral imperative. Interplays among and between green and brown consumers are investigated as differential games. Green preferences, the heterogeneity of consumers, and the irreversibility of emissions lead to discontinuous strategies. Associated with these are a number of non‐trivial and even puzzling features (e.g., the possibility of another “green paradox”).