Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment, and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics
研究了企业不能按入职年份歧视工资的模型，工人可随时辞职而企业受合同约束，求解工资和失业动态，发现实际工资存在向下刚性且不一定出清劳动力市场，并用美国战后部门生产率数据检验模型对实际失业序列的拟合能力。
This paper analyses a model in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry. It is assumed that workers can costlessly quit at any time, while firms are committed to contracts. We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment, and show that real wages display a degree of downward rigidity and do not necessarily clear the labor market. Using sectoral productivity data from the post-war US economy, we assess the ability of the model to match the actual unemployment series. We also show that equal treatment follows from the assumption of at-will employment contracting in our model.