Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
研究正规型博弈中进化选择动力学的稳定性，刻画了在连续时间确定性动力学下渐近稳定的策略面，并证明每个这样的面包含纳什均衡的本质成分。
This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces which are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and we show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria, and hence a strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).