Downward Wage Rigidity in a Model of Equal Treatment Contracting*
基于Bewley的见解，构建了一个企业不能按入职年份歧视性支付工资的均衡模型，分析工资向下刚性下的工资与失业动态，并用美国战后生产率数据检验模型对劳动力市场典型事实的匹配能力。
Abstract Following insights by Bewley (1999a) , this paper analyses a model with downward rigidities in which firms cannot pay discriminately based on year of entry to the firm, and develops an equilibrium model of wages and unemployment. We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment under conditions of downward wage rigidity, where forward‐looking firms take into account these constraints. We show that there is a frontloading incentive that leads to a simple solution in the case of certainty. Using productivity data from the postwar US economy, we analyse the ability of the model to match certain stylised labour market facts.