Cross‐Compliance for Erosion Control: Anticipating Efficiency and Distributive Impacts
分析交叉合规政策（将农业补贴与土壤保护挂钩）在侵蚀控制中的效率与分配效应，发现该政策可能效率不足，且主要惠及高资产和大农场经营者。
Abstract Despite increasing attention, the effects of using differential agricultural program benefits to achieve soil conservation are largely unexplored. Viewed in a conventional environmental economics framework, the popularly perceived cross‐compliance program may fall short on efficiency grounds. Analysis suggests that the greatest incentive to practice conservation may occur on land with little or no net social benefits forthcoming from erosion control. A by‐product of cross‐compliance worth consideration is that those likely to benefit most from the program are the highest equity and largest farm operators.